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FEDERAL FORMULATION OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
DAVID A. HIGLEY*
[1]t is desirable that there be uniformity of rule in the admini-
stration of the criminal law in- governments whose constitutions
equally recognize the fundamental principles that are deemed.
essential for the protection of life and liberty.
Mr. Justice John M. Harlan t
The Supreme Court, in Davis v. United States,' established a
uniform substantive rule allocating the burden of proof to the
prosecution when a defendant in a criminal case interjects the
special defense of lack of criminal responsibility.a That rule is
applicable to the federal judicial system, and, while it is preferable
to have "uniformity of rule in the administration of the criminal
law,"' 4 the state courts are not obliged to follow the federal stand-
ard. Thus, as announced in Leland v. Oregon,5 "[t]he [Davis] deci-
sion obviously establishes no constitutional doctrine, but only
the rule to be followed in federal courts."
6
* Captain, United States Marine Corps. Assigned to Judge Advocate Division, United
States Marine Corps. Member, New York Bar. B.S., State University of New York at
Buffalo, 1963; J.D., 1971.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect Department
of Defense or United States Marine Corps policy.
1. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895).
2. Id.
3. We are unable to assent to the doctrine that in a prosecution . . . it is
the duty of the jury to convict where the evidence is equally balanced on the
issue as to the sanity of the accused at the time of the [offense]. On the con-
trary, he is entitled to an acquittal of the specific crime charged if upon all
the evidence there is reasonable doubt whether he was capable in law of
committing crime.
Id. at 484.
4. See text at supra note 1.
5. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
6. Id. at 797. The lasting viability of Leland is questionable in view of recent
decisions such as In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970):
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
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Nevertheless, if there is to be federal uniformity in the im-
position of proof burdens, some disagreement remains as to what
or how much must be offered as evidence to establish criminal
responsibility. Most federal courts presently employ a test for
criminal responsibility written in present day vernacular and based
upon current psychiatric opinion, although a minority of federal
courts still employ what many scholars consider to be an anti-
quated concept of responsibility. For example, whereas the
M'Naghten7 plus irresistible impulse" yardsticks are utilized by the
First Circuit and military courts-martial,9 the other federal courts
of general criminal jurisdiction employ either dissimilar variations
of the American Law Institute's test,10 M'Naghten when couched
in present day language," or the Durham v. United States12 line ot
cases.
The continuing possibility of disparate treatment is cause for
concern where two standards of criminal responsibility are pre-
sent in the same legal order. If similar types and quanta of
7. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843).
See text of note 28 infra.
8. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1877); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48
Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 502 (1844) ; see text of note 44 infra.
9. Amador Beltran v. United States, 302 F.2d 48, 52-53 (Ist Cir. 1962); MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTAL UNITED STATES 120 (a) & (b) (rev. ed. 1969); see text of note
51 infra. See generally United States v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R. 314 (1954).
See also United States v. Mathis, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 130, 35 C.M.R. 102 (1964); United
States v. Enzor, 40 C.M.R. 707 (1969).
Courts-martial jurisdiction is limited to offenses having some military connection.
See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
547, 40 C.M.R. 259 (1969). See also Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. (1971).
10. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); Blake v. United States,
407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Schapiro,
383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966);
Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964);
United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961); see text at note 58, infra. See
also table at note 65, infra.
11. Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 735-36 (8th Cir. 1967) (M'Naghten or
any other test of criminal responsibility is permissible if other criteria are satisfied),
vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968); see discussion and sources at notes
57-58 infra.
12. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See cases and discussion at note 58 infra; cf.
State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870). See also Wash-
ington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967); McDonald v. United States,
312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
13. It is realized that military law has been characterized as a unique and sep-
arate brand of federal law. See generally Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953). Never-
theless, that branch of jurisprudence is included in this discussion, and is central
thereto, because the rights and law under discussion are federal.
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proof achieve dissimilar results, concepts of equality and fairness
are endangered. A legal philosophy which deems uniformity of rule
to be a "fundamental [principle] . . . essential for the protection of
life and liberty"'4 would seem to require a resolution of the varied
application of criminal responsibility tests within the federal judi-
cial infrastructure. Indeed, the spirit and rationale of Davis appear
to demand an evenhanded employment of defensive device stand-
ards.
Whether these two federally employed tests of criminal
responsibility tend to produce unequal treatment when the same
type and quantum of evidence is presented to the triers of fact is
the subject of the following discussion.
I. DUE PROCESS AND UNIFORMITY
The fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States states that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."' 5 Due process may be con-
sidered to be the proper application of substantive and procedural
devices to factual situations, and is "that which comports with the
deepest notions of what is fair and right and just."'16 That pro-
cess which is due from the standpoint of uniformity can best be
understood by considering the interplay of equal protection
It is quite clear that the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution is applicable to military and civilian accused alike. As noted
in Burns,
mhe constitutional guarantee of due process is meaningful enough, and suffi-
ciently adaptable, to protect soldiers-as well as civilians-from the crude in-
justices of a trial so conducted that it becomes bent on fixing guilt by
dispensing with rudimentary fairness rather than finding truth through adher-
ence to those basic guarantees which have long been recognized and honored
by the military courts as well as the civil courts.
346 U.S. at 142-43. The Court further stated that "military courts, like the state
courts, have the same responsibilities as do the federal courts to protect a person from
a violation of his constitutional rights." Id. at 142. See also United States v. Craw-
ford, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 31, 34, 35 C.M.R. 3, 6 (1964); United States v. CuIp, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 199, 206, 33 C.M.R. 411, 418 (1963); United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A.
428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47 (1960) ('T]he protections in the Bill of Rights,
except those which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are avail-
able to members of our armed forces."); United States v. Rawdon, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 396,
397, 26 C.M.R. 176, 177 (1958); United States v. McMahan, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 709, 723,
21 C.M.R. 31, 45 (1956).
14. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895).
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
16. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added).
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under due process, 7 and the requirement of predictability in
eventual application of law to facts.' 8
Uniform application of laws symbolizes a fundamental con-
cern for the equal rights of all individuals. This concept, individual
equality before the law, is the touchstone of American democracy,"0
and, therefore, it is not too surprising to find the federal judi-
ciary struggling to rectify divergent federal judicial views in order
to ensure equal treatment. Considerations of uniformity have been
expressed in the civil" and criminal 1 spheres; that concern has
also been stressed as the courts struggle to develop the proper
standard of criminal responsibility. 2
2
Governmental imposition of punishment or the loss of liberty
through imprisonment is indeed a bitter pill. The extent to which
the requirement of procedural safeguards to protect individual
-rights permeates the entire judicial system evidences a societal
desire to prevent the attachment of the stigma of criminality except
"17. "[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does
forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.'" Schneider
v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964), citing Bolling v. Sharpe, -347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
*See also United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283
(1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 US. 312 (1921); C. ANT.EAu, MoDERN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW § 8:94 (1969).
18. See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US. 347 (1964). See also cases cited
in Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097 nn.18-30 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
19. The Declaration of Independence proclaimed:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among
these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness ....
20. This is especially so in areas where there is an overriding federal interest.
See, e.g., Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 1A.M., 390 U.S. 557, 559 (1968) (labor-
management relations).
21. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.. 235 (1970); Williams v. Oklahoma City,
395 U.S. 458 (1969); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Douglas v. California,
372 U.. 553 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Smith v. Bennett,
365 U.. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950). The frequency with which such issues have been litigated within the area of
criminal law is indicative of the high judicial regard for fairness and personal liberty.
22. See Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908, 915 (5th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 726 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606,
614-15 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 769 (3d Cir. 1961);
cf. United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 926-27 (4th Cir. 1968).
In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-37 (1968), the Court refused to formulate
a constitutional rule of criminal responsibility to be applied in criminal cases by the
state courts. Cf. Mueller, M'Naughten Remains Irreplaceable: Recent Events in the Law
of Incapacity, 50 GEo. L.J. 105, 108-09 (1961): "Sooner or later, for the sake of uni-
formity, the United States Supreme Court must use its power of judicial interpretation
to clarify the situation ......
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where the act warrants blame23 and the prosecutorial methods are
worthy of approval. The uniform application of law to criminal
offenders may not make the deprivation of liberty less burden-
some, but it will tend to eliminate grievances based upon disparate
treatment. To ensure congruity with due process governmental
action must be uniform.
Predictability, on the other hand, while traditionally associ-
ated with the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, 4 provides a
measure against which the application of law may be judged.2 5
Difficulty in conforming to law is encountered where an ultimate
result of action cannot be anticipated. As outlined by Professor
Wechsler, "[c]onsiderations of equality and of effectiveness conspire
to demand that sanctions which are threatened generally be applied
with generality.... "26
Read together, these notions of anticipated result and parallel
treatment provide a fundamental element of due process. When
considered with cases like Davis, it becomes abundantly clear that
it is incumbent upon the federal courts to strive for the latter and
ensure the former. Only in this way can "public justice, which in
the interest of the common good prescribes a standard all must
strive to satisfy,"2 7 be maintained.
II. BURDENS OF PROOF AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE
As noted above, the federal courts presently utilize two dis-
tinct formulations of criminal responsibility. Since the following
23. Any proposal to abolish the concept of criminal responsibility directly
challenges our traditional moral philosophy with regard to crime. We stig-
matize the normal criminal with 'guilt' because he is a responsible moral agent
who, knowing right from wrong, voluntarily chose to do wrong, and therefore
he should suffer. The insane man exercised no such free choice. By definition,
he did not know right from wrong; he did not act with wrongful intent. It
would be unjust to brand a man as 'guilty' for committing an act which he
had not the mind to understand or avoid. And while it may be true that the
irresponsible offender must also be taken into custody, this is merely for the
protection of society and of himself, and not as punishment for crime.
H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DIsOIDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 483 (1954). See also A. GoLD-
STEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 9-10 (1967).
24. See cases cited at supra note 18.
25. "The imposition of criminal liability for behavior which a person could not
reasonably understand to be prohibited offends the most rudimentary considerations of
fairness. . . .All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or for-
bids." Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1968), citing, in
part, Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).




-materials will introduce and then discuss these different tests, the
reader should keep in mind that the important concern here is
not the correctness of the test itself; that is, whether one particular
test enjoys a higher degree of social-legal-psychiatric acceptance
than the other (although that question must necessarily be con-
sidered). Rather, what must be considered is how the relative
advantages or disadvantages of each test influence the prosecutorial
burden of proof: Does the test under consideration assist the gov-
ernment in meeting its burden? Or, after the defendant's sanity is
in issue, is the burden shifted as a practical matter to the prose-
cution?
A. M'Naghten and the Irresistible Impulse
Of all the tests of criminal responsibility, that announced in
M'Naghten's Case28 is the most known and, while in general dis-
repute by scholars,2 9 it is the standard utilized in the majority of
28. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843):
[E]very man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree
of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to
[the jury's] satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of in.
sanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the
act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong.
29. See, e.g., J. BIGGs, THE GUILTY MIND (1955); C. JEFFERY, CRIMINAL REsPoN-
smurrY AND MENTAL DisEAsE 15 (1967); Overholser, Criminal Responsibility: A Psy-
chiatrist's Viewpoint, 48 A.BAJ. 527 (1962).
The remarks of Mr. Justice Frankfurter to the British Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment are most pertinent:
I do not see why the rules of law should be arrested at the state of psycho-
logical knowledge of the time when they were formulated. . . .If you find
rules that are, broadly speaking, discredited by those who have to administer
them, which is, I think, the real situation, certainly with us-they are honoured
in the breach and not in the observance-then I think the law serves its best
interests by trying to be more honest about it.... I think that to have rules
which cannot rationally be justified except by a process of interpretation which
distorts and often practically nullifies them . . . is not a desirable system....
They are in large measure abandoned in practice, and therefore I think the
M'Naghten Rules are in large measure shams. That is a strong word, but I
think the M'Naghten Rules are very difficult for conscientious people and not
difficult enough for people who say 'We'll just juggle them' ....
REPORT OF THE BarrisH ROYAL COMMIssION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953 at 102
(1953).
At least one legislature has voiced dissatisfaction with the M'Naghten Rules:
NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 30.05: Mental Disease or Defect.
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American jurisdictions." Although several rather persuasive argu-
ments have been made in favor of M'Naghten's simplistic approach
to defining criminal responsibility3 the test is now disfavored by
the majority of federal courts32 and for very significiant reasons.
First, the test is phrased in terms of right and wrong. Con-
tinued reliance upon M'Naghten overlooks present psychiatric
knowledge that "[a]s a matter of fact, many patients in mental hos-
pitals who by any test whatever would be considered to be 'insane'
have at least some glimmering and sometimes a strong sense of
what is right and what is wrong." 33 Second, the formulation assumes
the existence of a logic tight compartment in which the delusions
hold sway leaving the balance of the mind intact. The rule disre-
gards the scientific concept of totality of personality with the
attendant possible loss of capacity to control actions. As stated
by Professors Redlich and Freedman:
the principles based on the M'Naghten rule reflect an anti-
quated approach that compartmentalizes intelligence, volition,
and effect; does not recognize the importance of drives and un-
conscious motivation; overestimates the importance of intel-
lectual processes and their influence on behavior; and does not
permit sufficient consideration of medical and psychological data
to give the court a complete psychiatric appraisal of the accused.34
1. A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such
conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity
to know or appreciate either:
(a) The nature and consequence of such conduct; or
(b) That such conduct was wrong.
The Commission Staff Notes to section 30.05 indicate that "This formula . . . consid-
erably expands the M'Naghten Rule formerly in vogue in New York. Lack of 'sub-
stantial capacity' is a more realistic measure than the total impairment required for
exculpation under the former statute." N.Y. PENAL LAw § 30.05 (McKinney 1967).
30. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 45 (1967).
31. See, e.g., Livermore & Meehl, The Virtues of M'Naghten, 51 MIrN. L. REv.
789, 856 (1967):
While more refined formulations may be possible, it is our contention that the
124-year-old M'Naghten rule with its focus on cognitive impairment is sounder
from the standpoints of the purposes of the criminal law, of present psychiatric
knowledge, and of ease of judicial administration than any of the newer tests.
Id. See also A. GOLDSTEIN, TnE INSANITY DEFENSE 64 (1967) (the fault with M'Nagh-
ten lies in the presentation); Mueller, M'Naghten Remains Irreplaceable: Recent Events
in the Law of Insanity, 50 GEo. L.J. 105 (1961) (test merely needs semantic updating).
32. See text at notes 57-58 infra.
33. Overholser, Criminal Responsibility: A Psychiatrist's Viewpoint, 48 A.B.A.J.
527, 530 (1962).
34. F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PsYCHIATRY 786
(1966). See also S. GLUEcK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 169-70 (1925);
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 567 (3d Cir. 1951) (dissenting
opinion).
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Third, M'Naghten does not permit the psychiatrist to communi-
cate his unique understanding of the psychic realities to the
finders of fact.35 Indeed, because of the extreme difficulty in de-
scribing various psychological concepts under the M'Naghten rules,
"answers supplied by a psychiatrist in regard to questions of
rightness or wrongness of an act or 'knowing' its nature almost
constitute a professional perjury. ' 36 Fourth, the psychiatrist under
M'Naghten is forced to "[usurp] to some extent the function of
the jury."37 Since questions of the defendant's sanity are framed in
terms of knowing right and wrong, and since whether the defend-
ant has that knowledge is the factual issue to be decided, psychiat-
ric opinion which tends to supply that answer as fact rather than
opinion steps beyond the bounds of normal testimony into the
area of jurisprudence consigned to the triers of fact. As noted in
United States v. Freeman:38
It is the psychiatrist who informs as to the mental state of the
accused-his characteristics, his potentialities, his capabilities.
But once this information is disclosed, it is society as a whole,
represented by judge or jury, which decides whether a man
with the characteristics described should or should not be held
accountable for his acts.30
Fifth, and of major importance to this thesis, the M'Naghten
rule relieves from punishment only those individuals who have
absolutely no cognitive knowledge-those who do not know the
nature and quality of the act or those who, knowing the nature
35. F. RucsH & D. FREEDMAN, THE THEoRY AND PRACITcE OF PsYcHIATRY 786
(1966).
36. Remarks of Dr. Lawrence Kolb, Director of the New York Psychiatric Insti-
tute, Second Circuit Annual Judicial Conference, Insanity as a Defense, 37 F.R.D. 365,
387 (1964). See also United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 619 (2d Cir. 1966).
37. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 767 (2d Cir. 1961). See also Washington
v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1967) where the court proposed a
solution to this problem as faced in that circuit:
A strong minority of this court has consistently advocated that psychiatrists
be prohibited from testifying whether the alleged offense was the 'product' of
mental illness, since this is part of the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury.
We now adopt that view. The term 'product' has no clinical significance for
psychiatrists. Thus there is no justification for permitting psychiatrists to testify
on the ultimate issue. Psychiatrists should explain how defendant's disease or
defect relates to his alleged offense, that is, how the development, adaptation and
functioning of defendant's behavioral processes may have influenced his conduct.
But psychiatrists should not speak directly in terms of 'product,' or even 'result'
or 'cause.'
38. 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
39. Id. at 620.
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and quality of the act, do not know the act is "wrong.40 Few
psychiatrists would agree with such'an over-simplified view of in.
sanity. It is modem medical knowledge that "an individual is k
mentally complex being with varying degrees of awareness. ' 41
"The law must realize that when there is no black and white it
must content itself with different shades of gray."42 Unfortunately,
M'Naghten restricts the jury to the choice between black or
white.,
The M'Naghten test of cognitive impairment has' received
minor assistance by an- added- factor generally- known as the irre-
sistible or uncontrollable impulse.44 That factor, which injects lack
of control into the definition of criminal responsibility, enjoys a
reputation as scientifically unsavory as M'Naghten.. On the one
hand, there is considerable difference of psychiatric opinion as to
the existence of that type of behavioral impulse.4 On the other
hand, even if there were such a behavioral aspect, the test is inap-
plicable in those situations where an accused after prolonged brood-
ing is compelled to commit crime. Such acts may 'be carefully
planned and cooly executed, but nevertheless be "the act of a mad-
man."
40
40. ... M'Naghten's single track emphasis on the cognitive aspect of the per-
sonality recognizes no degrees of incapacity." Id. at 618. See also. Wade v. United States,
426 F.2d 64, 66 (9th Cir. 1970); Overholser, Criminal Responsibility: A Psychiatrist's
Viewpoint, 48 A.B.A.J. 527, 528-29 (1962).
41. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 66 (9th Cir. 1970).
42. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE 158 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1956).
43. Dean Goldstein in his work on criminal responsibility indicates that the fault
with M'Naghten lies less with the rule than the formulation given to-it by lawyers, psychi-
atrists, commentators and juries. A. GoLDsmru, THE INsANrrY DEFENSE 53-64 (1967).
Legislative-type formulations of M'Naghten's rule indicate to the contrary. See, e.g.,
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIA. UNrmD STATES f 120 (b) (rev. ed. 1969) '("So far free from
mental defect, disease, or derangement') (emphasis added).
It should also be noted that most judges are lawyers, and, as such, they bring to the
bench many of the legal conceptions they believed in as practicing attorneys. Therefore, as
a practical matter, the courts also envision M'Naghten as a test demanding all or nothing.
If the fact were otherwise, why would the courts be so rapid to condemn?
44. If then it is proved, to the satisfaction of the jury, that the mind of the
accused was in a diseased and unsound state, the question will be, whether the
disease existed to so high a degree, that for the time being it overwhelmed the rea-
son, conscience, and judgment, and whether the prisoner, in committing the
homicide, acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse: If so, then the
act was not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body,
without the concurrence of a mind directing it.
Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 502 (1844). See also Parsons v. State, 81
Ala. 577,2 So. 854 (1887).
45. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 67 (9th Cir. 1970).
46. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1954). But see A. GOLD-
STEIN. THE INSANITY DEFENSE 70-79 (1967).
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In the federal sphere, only courts of the First Circuit and the
military continue to employ M'Nagh ten.47 However, should certain
dictum in Amador Beltran v. United States48 be followed, it is likely
that the viability of the M'Naghten test will be even more sharply
curtailed than its present utilization indicates.
In Amador Beltran the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit noted the defense contention that M'Naghten was no longer
the proper test of criminal responsibility, but declined to rule on
the broad issue without an adequate record, stating, however:
We commend to the district court's attention cases such as United
States v. Currens . . . and request that, on the new trial, if it
determines the defendant could properly distinguish between
right and wrong, it nevertheless make further findings so that
we may, if need be, give consideration to the matter.40
There appears to be no subsequent decisional law from the First
Circuit on this defensive device. Nevertheless, it is likely that
should the Circuit be given the opportunity to reexamine its posi-
tion on the proper standard of criminal responsibility, it too will
reject M'Naghten in favor of a more enlightened rule.
Military courts-martial, therefore, appear to be the only fed-
eral jurisprudential system firmly committed to M'Naghten and
its added control dimension. Under authority conferred by Con-
gress,"" the President has prescribed "right-wrong" plus irresistible
47. See text at supra notes 7-12. The Eighth Circuit permits M'Naghten instructions
if other criteria are satisfied. Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 735 (8th Cir. 1967),
vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968).
[W]e would hesitate to reverse a case where the trial court had employed in-
structions on insanity which this court has heretofore approved and henceforth
we would be loath . . . to reverse where . . . the trial court has used instructions,
whether based theoretically on a M'Naghten variation or on the test set forth in
the Modem [sic] Penal Code proposed by the American Law Institute or on that
form revised as suggested by the Third Circuit in Currens, or whether couched in
still other language, if the charge appropriately embraces and requires positive
findings as to 3 necessary elements, namely, the defendant's cognition, his volition,
and his capacity to control his behavior. If those 3 elements . . . are emphasized
in the court's charge as essential constituents of the defendant's legal sanity, we
suspect that the exact wording of the charge and the actual name of the test are
comparatively unimportant and may well be little more than an indulgence in
semantics.
.d. at 735.
48. 302 F.2d 48, 52 (lst Cir. 1962).
49. Id. at 52-53.
50. Uniform Code df Military Justice Art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1950):
(a) The procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts.martial,
courts of inquiry, military commissions, and other military tribunals may be
prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers
practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts. ...
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impulse as the sole test to determine criminal responsibility of
military accused in trials by court-martial. 51 This does not mean
that the question of M'Naghten's continued viability in courts-
martial has not been raised. In United States v. Smith,52 the defen-
dant attempted to persuade the Court of Military Appeals to adopt
the Durham rule.a The court rejected the request, almost out of
hand, and indicated that the President had formulated the stand-
ard for determining sanity in trials by courts-martial. Since Con-
gress had not overruled the President's formulation, the court in
Smith concluded it was bound to follow the prescribed formu-
lation.54 Ten years later the position in Smith was reaffirmed by
the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Mathis.l 5 There-
fore, even though M'Naghten appears to be outdated, the military
51. Paragraph 120 of the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 1969 (rev.
ed.) provides:
a. Insanity. A person is insane within the meaning of this chapter [Chapter
XXIV, Insanity] either if he lacked mental responsibility at the time of the offense
as defined in 120b, or if he lacks the requisite mental capacity at the time of trial
as stated in 120d.
b. General lack of mental responsibility. If a reasonable doubt exists as to the
mental responsibility of the accused for an offense charged, the accused cannot
be legally convicted of that offense .... A person is not mentally responsible in
a criminal sense for an offense unless he was, at that time, so far free from mental
defect, disease, or derangement as to be able concerning the particular act charged
both to distinguish right from wrong and to adhere to the right. The phrase
'mental defect, disease, or derangement' comprehends those irrational states of
mind which are the result of deterioration, destruction, or malfunction of the
mental, as distinguished from the moral, faculties. To constitute lack of mental
responsibility, the impairment must not only be the result of mental defect,
disease, or derangement but must also deprive the accused of his ability to dis-
tinguish right from wrong or to adhere to the right as to the act charged ...
[M]ental disease, in itself, does not always amount to mental irresponsibility.
For example, if a person commits an assault under psychotic delusion with a view
to redressing or revenging some supposed injury to his reputation, he is neverthe-
less mentally responsible if he knew at the time that the act was contrary to law,
and if he was not acting under an irresistible impulse ...
d. Mental capacity at time of trial. No person shall be brought to trial unless he
possesses sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings
against him and to conduct or cooperate intelligenty in his defense.
For the purpose of this discussion these provisions are almost identical to those found
in MANUAL FOR CoumrS-MARTiAL, UNrTED STATES 1951, f 120.
52. 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R. 314 (1954).
53. Unless the jury "believe beyond a reasonable doubt either that [the accused] was
not suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition, or that the act was not the
product of such abnormality, [the jury] must find the accused not guilty by reason of
insanity." Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
54. United States v. Smith, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 321-22, 17 C.M.R. 314, 321-22 (1954).
See also United States v. Kunak, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 355, 17 C.M.R. 346, 355 (1954).
55. 15 U.S.C.M.A. 130, 132, 35 C.M.R. 102, 104 (1964).
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continues to rely on the rule. The unfortunate consequences of
that reliance will be discussed later.
B. The American Law Institute Test
In 1962 the American Law Institute56 promulgated its formu-
lation of criminal responsibility. The ALI indicated in the Model
Penal Code57 that
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if
at the -time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the crim-
inality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law.(2) As used in -this Article, the terms 'mental disease or
defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by re-
peated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
The ALI test purposely avoided the restrictive provisions of the
M'Naghten plus irresistible impulse expressions of responsibility
by substituting substantiality for the prior requirement of total
impairment. Within the span of eight years, eight federal circuits
have adopted the formulation. 8 Nevertheless, several problems
have been noted.
First, the formulation contains optional provisions which can
be (have been) accepted or rejected by the judicial order adopt-
ing the test. For example, the courts may choose between "crimin-
ality" or "wrongfulness" in establishing the defendant's requisite
standard of appreciative capacity. A court may decide to employ
criminality because its legal philosophy desires to hold irrespon-
sible "those who, knowing an act to be criminal, [commit] it be-
56. Hereinafter referred to as ALl.
57. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Final Draft, 1962).
58. The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
adopted variations of the test. See supra note 10, and note 65 infra. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia employs a test which closely approximates that of the ALI:
mental illness "includes any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects
mental or emotional processes and [which] substantially impairs behavior controls."
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954), modified by McDonald v.
United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Since a lengthy description and analysis
of the test would be of little assistance to the theme of this thesis, such will not be
provided herein. Suffice it to say, for the purpose of this paper, that the Durham-
McDonald standards require quantums of proof very similar to that required by the Al
test. See also supra note 11.
More precisely, therefore, only the First Circuit and the military continue to rely
on M'Naghten plus irresistible impulse. But see text at supra notes 47-49.
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cause of a delusion that the act was morally justified."' 9 Other
courts, however, may choose wrongfulness for exactly the same
reason.60 Several federal courts of appeals have accepted the second
provision of the ALI test6 ' as a necessary ingredient of an acceptable
formulation of responsibility, 2 while others have expressly rejected
it.es Indeed, the standard is so susceptible to adaptation that, as is
made clear by United States v. Currens,6 4 the courts are faced with
unlimited possibilities.0
Two other objections to the ALI test are (1) the inherent
vagueness in a word such as "substantial," and (2) within the
federal judicial system, the unavailability of a legal device (i.e.,
59. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 71 (9th Cir. 1970) (noted, but rejected in
favor of "wrongfulness').
60. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606,622 n.52 (2d Cir. 1966).
61. MoDEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (2) (Final Draft, 1962).
62. See, e.g., Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc); United
States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968) (en banc); United States v. Freeman,
357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966) ; United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
63. See Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 72 (9th Cir. 1970) (en banc); United
States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 727 n.8 (6th Cir. 1968).
64. 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961). "The jury must be satisfied that at the time of
committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect,
lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he
is alleged to have violated." Id. at 774.
65. The divergence of viewpoint with respect to the ALI test is illustrated by the
following table:
ADOPTION OF THE AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE TEsr BY THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
Circuit Decision § 4.01(1) § 4.01(2)
Second United States v. Freeman, Wrongfulness Approved
357 F.2d 606 (1966)
Third United States v. Currens, Defendant, as a result Approved
290 F.2d 751 (1961) of mental disease or
defect lacked substan-
tial capacity to con-
form his conduct to
the requirements of the
law
Fourth United States v. Chandler, Criminality Approved
393 F.2d 920 (1968)
Fifth Blake v. United States, Wrongfulness Approved
407 F.2d 908 (1969)
Sixth United States v. Smith, Wrongfulness Rejected
404 F.2d 720 (1968)
Seventh United States v. Schapiro, Wrongfulness Unclear
383 F.2d 680 (1967)
Ninth Wade v. United States, Wrongfulness Rejected
426 F.2d 64 (1970)
Tenth Wion v. United States, Wrongfulness Unclear
325 F.2d 420 (1964)
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statute or writ) to detain an individual after acquittal for psychi-
atric examination and/or treatment."
While the shift to substantial impairment signifies a judicial
concern for scientific and social credibility in the jurisprudential
criminal responsibility formula, it may also be read as a concern
for public protection and personal (i.e., individual) liberty vis-
a-vis incarceration. On the one hand, society may be protected from
dangerous individuals by the provision of a more liberal defini-
tion of criminal responsibility. In United States v. Currens,7 the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated:
[W]e must point out that the M'Naghten Rules are not only
unfair to the individual defendant but are dangerous to society
. . . . '[T]he mental competency of recidivists should be ques-
tioned by realistic means at the earliest possible stage. So long as
the courts judge criminal responsibility by the test of know-
ledge of right and wrong, psychotics who have served prison
terms or are granted probation are released to commit increas-
ingly serious crimes. . . .' The throwing of the mentally ill in-
dividual from -the jail back into the community, untreated and
uncured, presents a great and immediate danger.68
On the other hand, by allowing treatment rather than requiring
incarceration, the individual stands a chance of recovering from
his illness and being returned to society with productive (as
opposed to criminal) potential. Indeed, as can be gleaned from
Currens the due process requirement of fairness may be more
readily realized by the treatment approach to the mentally ill
criminal defendant.0
C. The Prosecution's Burden of Proof and Discrimination
In Davis v. United States,70 as noted above, the burden of proof
on the issue of a defendant's responsibility rests with the prose-
66. See the excellent discussion of both of these problems in Wade v. United States,
426 F.2d 64, 75-86 (9th Cir. 1970) (dissenting opinion). The second objection referred
to does not pertain to the test, but to the propriety of its utilization. But see United
States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 767 (3d Cir. 1961), where the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit rejected MNaghten because the rules were "dangerous to society."
67. 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
68. Id. at 767, citing J. BEGGs, TE GurLT' MIND 144-45 (1955).
69. Id.
70. 160 U.S. 469 (1895) . See text at supra note 2.
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cution.71 The defendant is presumed to be sane and must present
some evidence of insanity to shift the burden to the government,
but, after the burden is transferred, the prosecution must,
theoretically, prove the defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt
or run the risk of a directed verdict of acquittal.72 Occasionally,
attempts have been made to distinguish between the burdens of
production and persuasion. Within the federal system the differ-
entiation is unnecessary as the burden rests with the prosecution as
to either-as soon as the defendant's sanity is in issue the govern-
ment must go forward with evidence and persuasion.73
The foregoing is true with regard to whatever standard of
criminal responsibility is employed by the courts. However, will
a particular rule provide a measure of assistance to the prose-
cution in meeting its burden? Will the defendant receive unequal
treatment when his sanity is judged by the M'Naghten rule rather
than the ALI formulation? The answer to each question, though
based in the main upon subjective analysis of authority, is in the
affirmative.
First, there is no doubt that the ALI standard of criminal
responsibility is significantly more liberal than the older
M'Naghten plus irresistible impulse formulation. ALI substitutes
''appreciate" for "know" thereby emphasizing the need for the
sane offender to be emotionally and intellectually aware of his
activity; "conform" is utilized rather than "control" to avoid any
reference to the irresistible impulse standard; and, unquestionably
of utmost significance, the defendant is not responsible for his con-
duct if he lacks substantial capacity-total absence of cognitive
knowledge is no longer necessary. 74 Defendants who are tested by
the M'Naghten formulation are at a tactical disadvantage; the pro-
secution has the upper hand. So long as the evidence presented to
the triers of fact portrays the defendant as being less than totally
impaired it is probable that a verdict of guilty will be rendered.
71. See, e.g., 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES § 403 (1969). See also
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARIA., UNITED STATES 1969, 122 (a) (rev. ed.). "The burden of
proving the sanity of the accused, like every other fact necessary to establish the offense
alleged, is always on the prosecution .. " Id. (emphasis added). The emphasized always
arises only after the sanity of the defendant has been placed in issue.
72. See, e.g., Fitts v. United States, 284 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1960). See also Bishop v.
United States, 394 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Westerhausen, 283 F.2d
844 (7th Cir. 1960) ; Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
73. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INsANrrY DEFENSE 110-12 (1967).
74. Id. at 87. See also United States v. Schapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1967).
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The.jurors are simply unwilling to concede that a person who
appears to be very much like themselves is insane and unaccount-
able for his conduct.75 The ALI formulation requires less evidence
to -sustain a finding of insanity thereby assisting the defendant, and
more accurately shifting the production and persuasion burdens
to the prosecution. The very rationale of cases such as Durham,,"'
Currens,77 Freeman 78 and Wade v. United States 79 in rejecting fur-
ther utilization of M'Naghten was to prevent the further employ-
ment of an all or nothing approach to insanity.
Second, the government has resisted the movement away from
M'Naghten for at least two reasons: the judicial acceptance of the
ALI's substantial incapacity rule requires more prosecutorial
effort to carry the burden of proof; furthermore, but undoubtedly
of secondary interest to the prosecutor, there is no procedure for
retention and examination of federal criminal defendants acquitted
by reason of insanity. It seems quite clear that the government
would not resist the shift to the ALI test if the prosecutorial bur-
den of proof remained the same as under M'Naghten or was
made lighter. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that gov-
ernmental resistance to change has been occasioned by a further
and more accurate shift in the burden of proof to the prosecution.
Third, the defendants tested by the ALI formulation enjoy
a significant advantage over those judged by the M'Naghten rules
with respect to acquittal 0 and subsequent rehabilitation in a non-
penal environment.8' Under M'Naghten, defendants who are
substantially, but not totally, impaired are convicted of crime, im-
prisoned without rehabilitative services, and paroled or released
in the same or worse mental condition. Society has not received
any protection through rehabilitative service or counselling, and
the mentally ill individual has not been provided with assistance
75. Jurors find it difficult to accept the idea of serious mental disorder unless it
is accompanied by visible and gross psychotic symptoms-either a breakdown in
ihtlect or the loss of self-control. In this respect, they share the reluctance of
most people to concede that persons who seem very much like themselves may be
seriously ill.
A. Com-swN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 63 (1967).
76. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See also McDonald v.
United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
7.7., United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
78. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
79. 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970).
80. Id. at 77-79.
81. Id. at 66-67. See also text at supra notes 67-69.
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to help him acknowledge, understand and cope with his prob-
lems. On the other hand, the ALI formula places the mentally
ill defendant in a position where he may be able to obtain
rieded psychiatric assistance. In this regard, the advantage of ALI
over M'Naghten is at once apparent and socially desirable.
These three foregoing factors ably indicate the disparate
treatment received by federal criminal defendants whose sanity
is judged by the M'Naghten plus irresistible impulse formulation
of criminal responsibility. Under ALI the burden of proof has
been effectively shifted to the prosecution and the opportunity for
rehabilitation to a productive non-criminal life is present.
Unequal treatment is received under M'Naghten because, while
the prosecutorial burden of proof and the opportunity for reha-
bilitation are present, they are present to -a much less significant
degree. Herein lies the vice of future utilization of M'Naghten by
the federal courts.
III. CONCLUSION
The due process requirements of fairness and predictability
unite to require a uniform application of criminal responsibility
standards to federal criminal defendants. Those defendants who
are tested by the ALT formulation are placed in a position signifi-
cantly advantageous to that of defendants judged by the M'Naghten
rules. Consequently, the lack of uniformity in the federal formu-
lation of criminal responsibility achieves disparate treatment. Cer-
tainly this is "discrimination ... so unjustifiable as to be violative
of due process""2 under the fifth amendment. For the military, the
remedy, in the absence of legislative reform, is a judicial declara-
tion of unconstitutionality and the adoption of a criminal responsi-
bility standard the same as or similar to that utilized by the courts
employing the ALI version. 3 As for the First Circuit, the court of
82. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
83. The focus of this paper on the test of criminal responsibility presently employed
by courts-martial does not mean to imply that the insanity defense utilized by the military
justice system is the only fault of that jurisprudential order requiring correction. Other
aspects of military law are deserving of attention. For example, the inability of a military
accused to obtain release on bail or bond pending the outcome of trial or appeal; the
almost total inability to obtain Supreme Court review of court-marital decisions; and
the unequal protection of military vis-a-vis federal civilian defendants in obtaining assist-
ance (i.e., investigators) to prepare the defendant's case. See also Higley, Flawed justice,
TMAL 45 (Sept.-Oct. 1971).
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appeals should reexamine its position with regard to M'Naghten
at the first opportunity8 and adopt a standard similar to that
utilized by the other circuits. In the alternative, military and
civilian defendants might request habeas corpus relief.8 1 In this
manner this disparity may be eliminated and uniformity of treat-
ment achieved.
84. In Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908, 909 (5th Cir. 1969), the court, sua sponte,
ordered en banc consideration of the case.
85. See, e.g., Scaggs v. Larsen, 396 U.S. 1206 (1969); Levy v. Parker, 396 U.S. 1204
(1969); Harris v. Nelson, 894 U.S. 286 (1969); Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217
(1969); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); United States v. Augenblick, 398 U.S. 848
(1969); Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122 (1968); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Bums v.
Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122 (1950); Gusik v.
Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (1950) ; Cf. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969).
In Augenblick, the Court stated:
Article 76 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 876, provides that
military review of court-martial convictions shall be 'final and conclusive' and
'binding upon all . . . courts . . . of the United States.' The legislative history
of the provision makes clear that relief by way of habeas corpus was an implied
exception to that finality clause ....
393 U.S. at 349-50.
In Noyd, the Court reaffirmed the "general rule that habeas corpus petitions from
military prisoners should not be entertained by federal civilian courts until all available
remedies within the military court system have been invoked in vain." 395 U.S. at 693.
